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THE NEAR EAST

A SURVEY OF POLITICAL TRENDS

IN 1925

by

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INTRODUCTION

THE history of the Near East continues to be written largely in terms of the interaction of a variety of European and Asiatic forces, psychological, economic and political. A review of the year 1925 gives unmistakable evidence of the importance of this interplay of influences. Mutual adjustments, mutual antagonisms, and preparations for impending conflicts make up an important part of the picture.

European political and economic imperialisms have been forcing the growth of new nationalisms in the Near East. Of late years British and French policies have made the greatest but not the sole contributions to this result; their occupation of wide Arab territories has synchronized with the development of a general Arab Nationalist movement new in the world's history and prophetic of important changes in the Near East.

To aid in the consolidation of its imperial system, Great Britain succeeded between 1914 and 1920 in driving a broad highway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf across a section of the Arab world. To insure the continued and effective possession of this highway it was necessary to bind the territories it traversed by the strongest economic and political ties to Great Britain. It was also necessary to make sure that any adjacent territories that were neither friendly nor neutral should be shut off from access to British lines of communication with India by protecting natural barriers. Thus in the mandated territory of Palestine Great Britain, in spite of the protests of the indigenous Arab population, encouraged a rapidly-increasing Jewish immigration which, it was anticipated, would ultimately be responsible for creating in the country a Jewish national state bound to Great Britain by ties of a perpetual gratitude born of the Balfour Declaration. Again, in the case of Iraq British energies were directed to the firm establishment of a unified Arab national state, thoroughly conscious of dependence upon Great Britain for its creation, preservation and the blessings of constitutional political life. After prolonged negotiations Great Britain has succeeded in procuring for this state a strategically defendable frontier, and in providing for it the additional protection which an autonomous Kurdistan will afford against possible Turkish encroachment on the north.

It has not been to the mandated territories alone, however, that Great Britain has looked for the means of maintaining communications with India and other parts of the Empire. The new Palestine-Transjordan-Iraq route is still subsidiary to the Suez route, which involves Great Britain in close relationships with Egypt on the one hand and the

Hedjaz on the other (although in the last analysis its most important requirement is British control of the ingress to the Mediterranean at Gibraltar and the egress to the Indian Ocean at Aden).

The policies adopted in Egypt and the Hedjaz were diametrically opposed to each other. In Egypt, where the Nationalist movement possessed a strength of organization and an immediacy of purpose unknown in Palestine, Transjordan or Iraq, coercion took the place of conciliation, and government by dictatorship, backed by military occupation, replaced constitutional government. The retirement of Lord Allenby removed from Egypt a High Commissioner noted for his comparative moderation. In his place was appointed a former governor of Bombay, Sir George Lloyd, known in Great Britain as a "Kitchener man" and, as such, representing that body of British opinion which supported a tightening of control in the Near East. The simultaneous appointment to Palestine of Field Marshall Sir Herbert C. O. Plumer, one of the foremost British soldiers of the day, necessitating as it did the unexpected recall from Jerusalem of the civilian High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, emphasized this tightening of British control. It made available for immediate use in case of emergency in any part of the Near or Middle East the services of a distinguished officer who had commanded the Second Army of the British Expeditionary Force in France during the Great War.

In contrast to the vigorous policy of coercion enforced in Egypt, a *laissez-faire* policy was adopted by Downing Street in the case of Arabia, where a war for the possession of the holy places of Islam was in progress between Great Britain's war-time ally, Hussein, the King of the Hedjaz, and Ibn Saud, Sultan of the Nejd. This policy somewhat amazed the Sherifian ruler of the Hedjaz. He had expected active British support against Ibn Saud (long a thorn in the flesh of the Iraq administration) as a reward for the timely support Great Britain had received from himself during the critical period of the Great War. Instead, Great Britain permitted Ibn Saud, the stronger of the two contestants, to assert his rights by force of arms, and then, by recognizing the extended jurisdiction of the victor, created a mutual cordiality which was of advantage to the ruler of Arabia and for the time being, at least, gave security to the southern borders of Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq and assured the friendliness of the power occupying the eastern littoral of the Red Sea.

British policy in the Near East during 1925 might then be summarized as involving a firm hand everywhere, rapid economic development of Palestine, maintenance of order among the undisciplined tribes of Transjordan, the securing of a strategic frontier and a region of agricultural and mineral wealth for Iraq, continuance of British control in Egypt in spite of the demands of Nationalists for complete evacuation, amicable relations with Ibn Saud whose right to dominate the Arabian peninsula was recognized, and finally, resistance to continued Russian penetration in Persia.

Arab Nationalist activity during the year under review remained for the most part in a state of arrested development in territories under British mandatory control. Whereas in 1920 Iraq had been the scene of a general Nationalist insurrection, the majority of the inhabitants had settled down by 1925 to the point of view that temporary British occupation was the inevitable price of ultimate independence, whose consummation should, however, be hastened by all possible means. In Palestine Moslem and Christian Arabs were exercised over the rapid settlement of the country by Jews from Central Europe and elsewhere, but beyond issuing occasional memoranda on the subject, engaged in no noteworthy nationalist activities. In Egypt, on the other hand, nationalist circles were seething with suppressed excitement and were only awaiting an opportunity for vigorous expression of their purpose to free the country from all foreign control.

The desires of French imperialists during the war had dictated Near East policies which resulted in the establishment of French mandatory control in Syria and the Lebanon. The attempt to maintain a form of control differing only in name from colonial domination had provoked discontent which during 1925 found expression in a general Syrian rebellion. The inability of France to crush the revolt gave indications of the virility of the Arab nationalist movement, and this fact, coupled with the ambitious character of Ibn Saud's program of conquest in the Arabian peninsula, suggested to many an opinion that the Arab world would maintain a vigorous struggle for unification.

Armenia, since 1921 a protégé of Russia, stood alone in the Near East in its complete preoccupation with economic rehabilitation to the exclusion of political conflicts, internal dissension of a serious nature, and collisions with foreign governments. Safeguarded at last on its western frontier from incursions on the part of Turkey, which was engaged for the time being in cultivating friendly relations with Russia, Armenian resources could now be devoted almost entirely to productive activities, since there was no necessity for the diversion of any important part of them to purposes of defense.

In Persia an intricate array of foreign interests, each attempting to dominate, and each having a partial but obscure hold upon the situation, made analysis of Persia's status difficult. Reaction against foreign domination of whatever sort gained, however, by the accession to the throne of a military dictator ambitious to retain in his own hands an effective control over his entire dominion.

The most fully-developed nationalism in the Near East is, however, that of Turkey. Already free of foreign domination, Turkey is devoting itself to the task of creating a national state strong enough and advanced enough in its form of civilization to force its way through to recognition as the equal of Western nations. The efforts of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, President of the Turkish Republic, to achieve this purpose have provoked a great deal of comment, both friendly and unfriendly, in the chancelleries of Europe.

UNREST IN EGYPT

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

Egyptian public opinion was still actively exercised in the early part of 1925 over the process of settling British claims arising out of the murder in November, 1924, of Sir Lee Stack, Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army and Governor-General of the Sudan. The British ultimatum presented to Zaghlul Pasha, at that time Premier of Egypt, had included the following demands, some of which still remain to be disposed of: an adequate apology for the murder; an indemnity of £500,000; the punishment of persons implicated in the crime; the suppression of further political demonstrations; acquiescence in British proposals for the protection of foreign interests in Egypt; the immediate withdrawal from the Sudan of all Egyptian military officers and of purely Egyptian units of the army; and, finally, notification to the Egyptian Department of Public Works that the Sudan Government would increase the Gezira irrigation area to an unlimited extent as need might arise.

Deep resentment was stirred up among Nationalist groups by the British announcement in January that the expelled Egyptian troops would be replaced by a Sudan Defence Force owing allegiance to the Governor-General of the Sudan but not to the King of Egypt. Zaghlul Pasha, leader of the Wafd, or Nationalist movement, declared that this action not only violated the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1899 whereby a condominium was established in the Sudan, but that it constituted an attack upon the sovereignty of Egypt itself. The British Government continued, however, to maintain that its action in this respect was justified on the ground that Egypt had been the first to violate the terms upon which the condominium was established and to ignore the implications arising out of the 1899 agreement.

Much more general was the consternation and excitement caused by the threatened diversion of an unlimited water supply from the Blue Nile for irrigation of the Gezira region. All parties were agreed that diminution of the Nile water supply would affect adversely the entire economic organization of Egypt. Ziwar Pasha, who, as a person amenable to British influence, had succeeded Zaghlul Pasha in the premiership, accordingly referred this clause of the ultimatum back to Lord Allenby for reconsideration. The clause had already met with open condemnation in Great Britain, where Lloyd George had attacked it in the House of Commons. It was now decided to suspend its application, and an arbitral committee of three, consisting of Egyptian and Sudanese representatives acting together with a neutral Dutch chairman, was appointed to inquire into the matter and propose a basis upon which irrigation could be carried out in the Sudan without detriment to natural and historic rights of the Egyptian people. This action on the part of Great Britain eased the tension in Egypt to a very considerable extent.

By August 23, 1925, when eight of the nine persons tried for complicity in the murder of Sir Lee Stack were executed, settlement of the British demands was practically completed and popular interest had already shifted from the November ultimatum to Egyptian internal politics.

THE EGYPTIAN PARLIAMENT

Difficulties had been dogging the footsteps of the new Premier. Elections held in February and March had resulted in the return of a majority for his Nationalist rival, Zaghlul Pasha, who was elected President of the Chamber of Deputies by 123 votes to 85. Ziwar Pasha, foreseeing that the present Chamber would block all legislation and press for complete independence for Egypt and the withdrawal of British authority from the Sudan, announced a dissolution of Parliament and indicated the early promulgation of a new electoral law, under whose terms a fresh election would be held on May 23. It was not until several months later, however, that the Electoral Law Revision Commission under Ismail Sidky Pasha, Minister of the Interior, completed its work. The effect of the new law was to reduce the electorate by more than a third. All male citizens over 40 were accorded the franchise. The minimum voting age was raised from 21 to 25. Male citizens between the ages of 25 and 40 might vote only if they came within the following categories: property-holders paying an annual minimum tax of £E2; persons paying a minimum annual rent of £E24; persons holding diplomas permitting practice in some liberal profession.

When the Nationalist group learned, after the promulgation of this law, that elections had again been postponed indefinitely, Zaghlul Pasha called together a Rump Parliament of liberal and extremist deputies who elected him a second time president of the Chamber and, declaring the March dissolution illegal, defied the authority of the Prime Minister to suspend the constitution any longer. The difficulties of the Premier were augmented by the fact that four members of his Cabinet, including the Ministers of Justice and the Interior, had been forced out of office because of the liberal stand they had taken in a fundamentalist-modernist controversy, which had recently been exercising the minds of Egyptian Moslems. But in spite of untoward incidents, Ziwar Pasha continued to impose his will upon the country by virtue of support received from the Ittehad or Unionist group and more especially on account of the backing of the British authorities, whose position in Egypt had been strengthened during recent months by an eleven per cent increase in the Egyptian army of occupation.

BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT

Early in December settlement was made of the long-standing territorial dispute between Italy and Egypt over the possession of Jaghbub, an oasis not far east of the Tripoli frontier, where the Senussi, a sect of Moslem zealots, had their headquarters. The Milner-Scialoja agreement of 1919 had provided, before Egypt was granted independence, that the Jaghbub Oasis should be transferred to Tripoli; but Egypt had subsequently refused to ratify this agreement. Italy then entered into direct negotiations with Egypt, whose reluctance to cede the desert entrepot caused protracted discussions to ensue. According to the final agreement, however, Jaghbub was added to the Italian colony of Tripoli, while Egypt received in compensation a small piece of territory surrounding the Mediterranean port of Sollum.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The economic situation in Egypt was less satisfactory in 1925 than formerly. During the first nine months of 1923 and 1924 exports had exceeded imports, but the corresponding period for 1925 showed an unfavorable trade balance of £E3,884. The 1925 cotton crop was of a good quality but had to compete with a large American crop and suffered from instability of the world market. Although building operations were unusually extensive throughout the year, trade as a whole was dull, partly on account of the political uncertainties from which the country had suffered.

ARABIA AND THE CALIPHATE

FALL OF THE HEDJAZ KINGDOM

One of the most significant readjustments of the year in the Near East followed upon the conclusion of a two-year struggle between the two leading potentates of Arabia for the possession of the holy places of Islam. On the one hand was King Ali of the Hedjaz, son of King Hussein, Sherif of Mecca, who by virtue of British support, earned by the adherence of the Sherifian family to the allied cause during the war, had ruled in the newly-created kingdom from 1916 until he abdicated in favor of his son in 1924. Opposing the Sherifians was Ibn Saud, Sultan of the Nejd, who by reason of victories over the ruler of El Hasa on the Persian Gulf (1914) and Ibn Rashid of Jebel Shammar in the desert north of the Nejd (1921), now held sway over a desert territory of some 730,000 square miles to the east of the Hedjaz.

Open conflict between eastern and western Arabia had commenced in 1924 when King Hussein, who not long before had assumed the rôle of Caliph, allowed his subjects to encroach upon the territories of his eastern neighbor. Ibn Saud, who in addition to his duties as a secular ruler, was leader also of the Wahabis, a puritanical Moslem brotherhood of the desert, opposed both territorial encroachments and religious pretensions of his rival, King Hussein, with such success that Mecca was captured (October 13, 1924) and the new-made Caliph was forced to retire to private life, leaving his temporal throne, but not his spiritual office, to his son Ali.

Throughout the greater part of 1925 the rival forces of Ibn Saud and Ali faced each other from their respective strongholds at Mecca and the seaport of Jeddah forty miles away. From January to June the Wahabi forces laid siege to Jeddah without result. In August Ibn Saud began an attack upon Medina, the second most holy city in the Moslem world, situated at the terminus of the Hedjaz railroad, two hundred miles north of Mecca. It was not, however, until December 5th, 1925, that this important city fell. Ali was able to hold out at Jeddah for another fortnight, but on December 19th abdicated, and surrendered his last stronghold to Ibn Saud. He himself went to live in exile at the court of his brother, King Feisal, at Baghdad, while his father, the ex-King Hussein, continued to live in Cyprus whither he had gone on the invitation of the British Government in June, 1925.

Thus culminated a struggle which had given concern to the entire Moslem world and was of no little moment to the British Government. In the case of Moslems the struggle had not only entailed immediate inconvenience to hundreds of thousands of pilgrims to Mecca, but it also involved the future guardianship of the holy places, and even the Caliphate itself. An Indian Caliphate Committee had spent several months in the Hedjaz in a vain attempt to reconcile the conflicting claims of Ibn Saud and King Ali. In Egypt also, where King Fuad was known to cherish ambitions respecting the vacant Caliphate, efforts were made to bring to a peaceful conclusion the activities of the warring leaders. What the attitude of one section of Islam would be in the event of Ibn Saud's assumption of the Caliphate was made clear in the latter part of September when the All-India Moslem Conference meeting at Lucknow adopted a resolution to the effect that Ibn Saud's authority even over the Hedjaz would not be tolerated.

BOUNDARIES OF IBN SAUD'S DOMINIONS

To the Idrisi family, ruling over Asir directly south of the Hedjaz, the victory of Ibn Saud brought premonitions of disaster similar to that which had overtaken Hussein and Ali, for already the northern portion of their territory had been annexed by the victorious Sultan of Nejd. Similarly the Imam Yehia, ruler of Yemen still farther down the Red Sea coast, and a good friend of the former kings of the Hedjaz, foresaw an early struggle to retain his domain. In short it was generally expected that Ibn Saud's December victory would not satisfy his aspirations and that he would continue to push forward his frontiers until they enclosed the entire Arabian peninsula.

From the viewpoint of Great Britain the expansionist movement in the Nejd had raised a series of problems related to the mandated territories of Iraq and Transjordan which adjoin Ibn Saud's Sultanate on its northern side. In these territories reigned respectively King Feisal and the Emir Abdullah, both of them sons of Ibn Saud's enemy, the ex-King Hussein. Repeated attempts in former years on the part of Great Britain to negotiate a boundary agreement with Ibn Saud had failed, with the result that relations between the Arab Sultan and the British Government had been strained throughout the year 1924. But in 1925 another effort was made to arrive at an understanding. A British emissary, Sir Gilbert Clayton, went in person to Arabia and succeeded in November in negotiating a treaty with Ibn Saud whereby a special boundary tribunal was established to safeguard the Iraq and Transjordanian frontiers. The tribunal was to meet at regular intervals to investigate boundary incidents and fix penalties which would be exacted in conformity with tribal custom by the Government concerned. The tribunal was to be made up of an equal number of representatives of each Government, who were to choose their own chairman. The agreement eliminated any immediate danger of a Wahabite attack upon Transjordan and Iraq and established a *modus vivendi* between Great Britain and the ruler of three quarters of Arabia.

TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT IN IRAQ

THE MOSUL QUESTION

In Iraq itself the attempts of Ibn Saud to claim jurisdiction over former subjects now resident within the territories of King Feisal, caused much less concern than the impending delimitation of the northern boundary of Iraq. *De facto* occupation of the Mosul Vilayet by Great Britain as far north as the provisional boundary had made that province for all intents and purposes one of the administrative units of Iraq. But the fact that Great Britain and Turkey had entrusted the ultimate disposition of this territory to the Council of the League of Nations, made it uncertain whether Mosul would continue to remain within the Arab kingdom or be handed back to Turkey.

Popular attention was focussed on the subject when a League Boundary Commission arrived in Baghdad on January 16 to gather information which would assist the Council in reaching its decision. In an attempt to arrive at the wishes of the many diverse elements of the population the Commission spent two months in the disputed territory, interviewing persons introduced by the British and Turkish assessors who accompanied the party. Extensive notes were also made on ethnological, historical, economic, strategic and religious data having a bearing on the dispute. One of the immediate effects of the inquiry was to intensify local feeling concerning the boundary dispute and to create a fever of excitement in the minds of some of the inhabitants, who participated in public demonstrations in favor of Turkey on the one hand or of Great Britain on the other.

In July the Commission submitted its report. After describing its findings with great detail it offered three suggestions upon any one of which the Council might, if it so desired, base its final decision:

(1) Important arguments, particularly of an economic and geographical nature, and the sentiments of the majority of the inhabitants of the territory taken as a whole, operated in favor of the union with Iraq of the whole territory south of the provisional boundary,* subject to two conditions (a) that the territory remain under the effective mandate of the League of Nations for a period which might be put at twenty-five years; (b) that regard be paid to the desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed for the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice, and teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish should be the official language of all these services.

(2) If League control were to terminate on the expiry in 1928 of the four-year treaty now in force between Great Britain and Iraq, and if certain guarantees of local administration were not to be given to the Kurds, the majority of the people would have preferred Turkish to Arab sovereignty. For political reasons also it would be more advantageous,

* This statement was made subject to certain reservations previously indicated in the report. The attitude of most of the people was said to have been influenced by the desire for effective support under the mandate, and by economic considerations, rather than by any feeling of solidarity with the Arab kingdom.

if the specified conditions were not fulfilled, for the territory to remain under the sovereignty of Turkey, whose internal conditions and external political situation were reported by the Commission to be incomparably more stable than those of Iraq.

(3) Should the Council decide to partition the territory, the Commission suggested that a line following approximately the Lesser Zab River would be the best boundary. Partition along this line would restore to Turkey roughly two-thirds of the Mosul Vilayet. The Commission added, however, that from the point of view of the interests of the populations concerned, it would be better not to partition the disputed area.

BRITISH AND TURKISH POINTS OF VIEW

At its September session the League Council took up the report of the Boundary Commission, giving the disputants an opportunity to make comments upon it before decision was rendered.

The Turkish argument put forward at this meeting may be summarized as follows:

Turkey had never renounced sovereignty over the Mosul Vilayet and did not intend to do so unless popular demand for connection with Iraq, expressed through a fairly-conducted plebiscite, indicated that the inhabitants preferred to be governed from Baghdad, rather than from Angora. The great majority of the inhabitants of the district belonged, however, to the various races already represented in Turkey. Therefore a plebiscite would have shown the majority of the population to be indisputably in favor of union with Turkey. But the League Commission had failed to institute a plebiscite and its findings, based upon selective interviews, could not serve as the basis of a just decision.

Turkey refused to acquiesce in the argument that Mosul's economic interests bound it inevitably to Baghdad. A not insignificant part of Mosul trade was across Syria, and there was no reason why there should not be a heavy northward trade with Turkey and Europe when railroad lines had been built connecting Mosul with the Black Sea. Meanwhile the existing southward trade might continue unimpaired if economic agreements affecting the regions on both sides of the Turco-Iraq boundary were entered into by Turkey and Iraq.

Finally, some check must be placed upon the progressive territorial ambitions of Great Britain, whose Foreign Office had begun by describing Iraq as consisting of the two Vilayets of Baghdad and Basrah only, but had gradually amplified the meaning of the term until now it was used to cover in addition not only the whole Vilayet of Mosul but part of the northern Vilayet of Hakkari as well. To dispose of mutual suspicions of territorial ambitions the Turkish delegate proposed that after Turkey had been awarded the Mosul Vilayet a four-power guarantee pact should be entered into by Iraq, Great Britain, France and Turkey assuring the integrity of the boundaries and obviating the necessity of stationing large bodies of troops in frontier districts.

The British representative, acting on behalf of the mandated territory, had affirmed that the disputed area was strategically and economically indispensable to Iraq. The best strategic frontier was to be found, he said, in the high mountain ranges north of the provisional boundary. The frontier suggested by Turkey and the compromise line suggested by the Commission were both strategically unsatisfactory. To deprive Iraq of the rich Vilayet from which came a substantial part of its revenues as well as some of its best army recruits, and then to leave the country in a weakened state with a strategically indefensible frontier, would be to impose a task beyond the capacity of Iraq to fulfill.

The Turkish proposal for a four-power guarantee pact was ignored.

The British representative also emphasized the finding of the Commission that on the whole popular sentiment was favorable to Iraq rather than to Turkey. He acknowledged, to be sure, that the Commission had found this sentiment somewhat tepid. But the Commission had stated on the other hand that the Turks were mistaken in their assertions that the majority of the inhabitants were indisputably anxious to return to Turkey. The very lack of an overwhelming popular sentiment in favor of either Turkey or Iraq made it apparent that the necessities imposed by the geographical and economic situation of Mosul must be given precedence over purely ethnic considerations. In any case the Kurds, who formed 62 per cent of the population of the disputed district would prefer autonomy within the Kingdom of Iraq to unconditional inclusion in Turkey. The recent Kurdish revolt in the eastern vilayets of Turkey indicated the incompatibility of Turks and Kurds.

ACTION OF THE LEAGUE

An impasse was reached at Geneva on September 19, when it became apparent that the Turkish delegate would insist that the function of the Council was mediation rather than arbitration and that his country would not be bound by a decision reached without its consent. He declared that it was on this understanding, based on assurances given by Lord Curzon at Lausanne, that Turkey had permitted the dispute to be laid before the Council.

Minutes of previous Council meetings indicated, however, that both Turkish and British delegates had undertaken in 1924 to abide by the forthcoming decision of the Council.

The Council thereupon referred the question of its jurisdiction to the Permanent Court of International Justice, which on November 21 rendered an advisory opinion that the decision of the Council would be binding upon the disputants and would constitute a definitive determination of the boundary between Turkey and Iraq. The decision in this case would be taken by unanimous vote, the votes of representatives of the disputants not being counted in ascertaining whether there was unanimity. The Turkish Government refused to recognize the right of the Permanent Court to render a judgment in the matter and persisted in the view that the two parties had resorted only to the good offices of the

League Council; thus in the event of the Council decision being unsatisfactory to one of the parties, the way would still be open for further negotiations on the matter.

On December 16 the League Council announced its award. The decision was based on the first of the three suggestions submitted by the Boundary Commission; viz., that the disputed territory be awarded to the Arab kingdom on the double condition that Great Britain prolong its mandatory relationship with Iraq for twenty-five years and that a degree of autonomy be granted the Kurds. The League invited Great Britain to act as far as possible in accordance with other suggestions of the Commission for pacification and protection of all elements of the population, and to endeavor also to inaugurate the commercial measures indicated in the Commission's report.*

EFFECTS OF THE LEAGUE DECISION

In Great Britain the prolongation of the mandate which was now costing the British exchequer over £4,000,000 annually, was opposed by many on the ground that it entailed unjustifiable expenditure. However, on December 21 the British House of Commons accepted the decision of the League Council and undertook to fulfill the conditions specified. The motion was passed without the participation of members of the Labor Party who left the House in a body as a protest against prolongation of the Iraq mandate.

Rumors were rife that the response of Turkey to the League decision would be a declaration of war. A large body of Turkish troops had been stationed for some months not far from the provisional boundary; the attitude of the Turkish delegate at Geneva had been threatening; and it was known that at Angora the Turkish Chief of Staff had been attending meetings of the Cabinet at which the Mosul situation was discussed. In spite of these circumstances it seemed unlikely at the end of the year that Turkish leaders would hazard a war in which the country would be liable to sanctions provided in Article XVI of the League Covenant and in which it was probable that Greece and Italy would join in the hope of making territorial gains at the expense of the Turkish Republic. Conversations between the British Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish ambassador at London were inconclusive, however, and there was still much uncertainty as to the outcome when the year closed.

In Iraq itself the award was received with mixed feelings. Government officials and Christian clergy expressed gratification at the outcome. Dissatisfaction existed in Turkish communities and in districts where the inhabitants were known to harbor pro-Turkish sentiments. There had been a certain diminution of the group which supported the claim of Turkey. This was caused by the events of September when sev-

* These included special commercial agreements with Syria and Turkey. The concluding section of the Report reads in part: "If the disputed territory is assigned to Iraq, its inhabitants should be given full freedom of trade with Turkey and Syria, and, moreover, facilities should be afforded to the Turkish frontier towns to use the Mosul route for exporting their produce and importing manufactured articles."

eral thousand refugees—most of them Christians, but including some Moslems also—arrived in villages south of the provisional boundary in a state of destitution. Their reports indicated a series of attacks on the villages north of the boundary by bands of Turkish soldiers, originally, it seemed, for purposes of loot and rapine, but finally directed to the wholesale deportation of the inhabitants, who were told that the district was soon to become a battleground between the Turks and the British, which necessitated their removal to other regions. The general movement was reported to have been northeastward; the progress of deportees was said to have been attended by indescribable suffering. Large numbers of men and women were understood to have been killed. A League Commissioner had been despatched to investigate these and other border incidents complained of by both Turkish and British representatives at Geneva, and to report to the Council in case further disturbances should arise. Prevented by the Turkish government from visiting the region north of the provisional boundary, the Commission was able to base its report on the deportations only on the statements of refugees south of the provisional boundary, among whom there was substantial agreement as to the facts.

Powerful foreign oil interests represented in the Turkish Petroleum Company, being confident of their ability to control the development of the Mosul oil fields whether the latter were awarded to Turkey or whether they remained within the jurisdiction of Iraq, had been less concerned over the actual terms of the forthcoming award than they had been over the long delay in deciding the status of the Vilayet. The Geneva decision proved, however, to be especially advantageous to these interests since, in anticipation of the award, they had already secured from the Iraq Government on March 14, 1925, a seventy-five year concession for the development of oil reserves in the Vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad. The groups participating in the Turkish Petroleum Company were as follows: The Anglo-Persian Oil Co. (controlled by the British Government) 25 per cent; the Royal Dutch-Shell group (two-fifths British capital) 25 per cent; the Compagnie francaise des petroles (67 French companies) 25 per cent; an American group (Standard Oil Company of New York, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Gulf Oil Corporation, Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corporation and the Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Company) 25 per cent. A technicality had prevented the actual consummation of American participation, but the principles and terms upon which the group would be admitted to a twenty-five per cent share in the Turkish Petroleum Company had already been agreed upon, and toward the close of the year negotiations were in progress to complete the transfer of these holdings from their former owners to the American group.

The publication of the League award, in spite of the refusal of Turkey to recognize its validity, introduced an element of stability in the affairs of Iraq, the previous lack of which had had a partially paralyzing effect upon trade and the development of the natural resources of Mesopotamia.

THE SYRIAN UPRISING

FRENCH administrative policies in the mandated territory of Syria were sharply challenged in 1925 by an Arab Nationalist uprising more momentous than any of the six or seven outbreaks that had occurred since the French occupation was inaugurated in 1919. It necessitated military operations on a scale which had been approached only in the summer of 1920 when General Gouraud, first French High Commissioner to Syria, had fought against armed Arab Nationalists in order to extend French administrative control over the territory east of the Lebanon. Since the French occupation of Damascus and the overthrow of Feisal's kingdom in July 1920, disturbances in Syria had been of a sporadic nature, partly because the occupying authorities had discouraged the formation of any organization which might have served as a conductor of Arab Nationalist sentiment. But in March 1925, an avowedly Nationalist People's Party was founded with the sanction of High Commissioner Sarrail, for the purpose of bringing outstanding grievances to the attention of the French authorities. The existence of this organization, with branches in various parts of the country, facilitated the spread of the insurrection that broke out later in the year.

CAUSES OF UNREST

Among various causes of discontent prevalent in the mandated territory outside of the Lebanon* four outstanding grievances may be mentioned:

1. Whereas Great Britain had formally recognized the mandated territory of Iraq as a sovereign, independent state, the French government had ignored Syrian claims for similar treatment. Since the general level of education was undoubtedly higher in Syria than in Iraq, the French policy was felt to be particularly unjust.
2. The phraseology of Article XXII of the League Covenant and the terms of the Syrian mandate, as well as an Anglo-French declaration of November 7, 1918, had led Syrians to expect freedom to retain their own form of government. But the French authorities, far from confining themselves to the rôle of friendly advisers to the existing native government, had driven out the Syrian king and established what amounted to direct French control, scarcely distinguishable from the normal colonial form of administration.
3. The territorial division of Syria was instanced as another obnoxious feature of French policy. It had been the purpose of the Arabian war-time allies of Great Britain to establish a strong Arab kingdom in this region as soon as its liberation from Ottoman control had been effected. Decentralization militated against the ultimate fulfilment of this legitimate ideal.


* Within the Lebanon pro-French sentiment prevailed. French intervention in 1860 after a massacre of Maronite Christians at the hands of their Druse neighbors had secured from Turkey a degree of autonomy for Mount Lebanon under the protection of several European Powers led by France. For sixty years the Lebanese had thus enjoyed active French protection.

4. Freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of speech were still for the most part empty phrases. Although personal liberty had been established in principle, there existed in fact a strict press censorship, and banishments and imprisonments had taken place without even a show of court trial.

These and other grievances were enumerated in statements issued by the People's Party and formed the rallying cry of Syrian Nationalism.

FIRST PHASE—LOCAL INSURRECTION

The 1925 rebellion began late in July as a local insurrection in the Jebel Druse, a district of the State of Hauran in southern Syria, inhabited by the warlike and untamed adherents of a secret sect. The uprising took the form of a protest against High Commissioner Sarrail's treatment of Druse chieftains who had vainly petitioned for the recall of Captain Carbillet, French governor in the Hauran. When it became apparent that their charges against Captain Carbillet of provocative and unreasoning harshness would meet with no response from the High Commissioner, the tribal chieftains produced the text of a Franco-Druse agreement of March 4, 1921, and demanded the putting into effect of Article III which provided for the election of the Governor of the Hauran by duly designated local representatives. The petitioners explained that Captain Carbillet had been appointed directly by General Weygand, the former High Commissioner, at a time when partisan Druse electors had been unable to agree upon a native governor, but they stated that the appointment was a temporary one, and urged that since Captain Car-



SKETCH MAP OF SYRIA AND THE LEBANON


billet had forfeited the confidence of the inhabitants, who had now agreed upon a native candidate, the time was ripe for implementing the promises made in 1921 by General Gouraud's representative, M. de Caix. High Commissioner Sarrail replied by imprisoning his petitioners and confiscating their copy of the de Caix agreement. There followed an immediate outbreak in the Jebel Druse under the leadership of Sultan Pasha al Atrash. A French garrison was besieged in the citadel of Sueida, capital of the Hauran. Early in August a French relief column and convoy were cut to pieces by Druse insurgents not far from Sueida, and only after a few thousand reinforcements had been hurried to Syria was the relief of the French garrison effected by General Gamelin on September 24.

SECOND PHASE—INSURRECTION SPREADING NORTHWARD

The submission of a member of the Atrash family and the momentary cessation of active hostilities made it appear during the first week of October that the insurrection was at an end. But it proved to be only a brief lull. A few days later an outbreak occurred in the city of Hama. It was met by air action involving the death of approximately 500 persons. A similar disturbance was planned in Aleppo, but was prevented by the influence of a few prominent citizens opposed to the revolutionary movement and by a timely parade of what troops the French commander could muster in the city and surrounding districts. During the third week of October Damascus itself became affected. The Syrian metropolis had been a centre of Nationalist agitation ever since 1920 when King Feisal had been driven out by General Gouraud. The renewed military activity in the Hauran to the south and the unrest in the north had created a tense situation in Damascus itself, and when it was discovered about this time that the French authorities were parading through the streets bodies of Damascenes shot outside the city as brigands, a hostile demonstration commenced. Bands of armed men looted parts of the city, firing wildly in the air. The French authorities, under the impression that insurrection on a serious scale had broken out in the city, raked the bazaars and well-known public and residential districts with machine-gun fire while bombs were dropped upon the city from the air. The bombardment continued from the 18th to the 20th of October, ceasing when Damascene notables accepted on behalf of their fellow-citizens penalties imposed by the French authorities in the form of a fine of 3,000 rifles and £100,000 in cash.

THIRD PHASE—THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ACTS

Attacks on the Sarrail administration carried on by *L'Echo de Paris* in late September had failed to secure the recall of the High Commissioner during the first phase of the revolt, but popular indignation in France over what was considered a wanton bombardment of the ancient city of Damascus now induced the Cabinet to take action and on October 30th General Sarrail was summoned to Paris to submit a report of his administration. On November 7th it was announced that a civilian High Commissioner in the person of Senator Henri de Jouvenel would be despatched to Syria to pacify the country, consolidate the French mandate and inaugurate a more liberal administration.





NEAR EAST

Notorious lack of cordiality in the cooperation of British and French authorities in the Near East was recognized as a potential source of embarrassment to the new High Commissioner, as it had been to his predecessors. The first official action of M. de Jouvenel was accordingly to discuss the situation with Mr. Austen Chamberlain in London. It was recognized that both France and Great Britain, as mandatory powers in Arabic-speaking territories, had interests at stake which would be best served by a speedy termination of the Nationalist uprising. Furthermore, the fact that Great Britain was facing a possible war with Turkey for the possession of the Mosul Vilayet, adjoining Syria on the east, made an Anglo-French understanding doubly desirable. After he had secured a private agreement with the British Minister for closer cooperation M. de Jouvenel set out for Syria.

REBELLION SPREADS EAST AND WEST

Meanwhile the insurrection in Syria had been spreading rapidly. Nationalist leaders in Damascus early established close communication with the Druses of the Hauran in an attempt to direct and extend the revolutionary movement along well-defined lines. Damascus itself was quiet at first but in surrounding districts hostilities continued and there were sympathetic movements in the eastern desert near Palmyra and Deir-es-Zor. By November 2 the movement had spread northward from Damascus as far as Homs, involving outlying villages in its progress. Within the following fortnight a large body of Druse tribesmen under Zeid Atrash, brother of Sultan Pasha al Atrash, had worked around the southern end of the Anti-Lebanon and carried the attack into the State of Greater Lebanon where another group of Druses resided side by side with Maronite Christians of overwhelmingly pro-French sympathies. Hasbeya and Merj Ayun were taken in this district and Rashaya and the seaport town of Sidon were menaced. Before the end of November, however, French reinforcements had poured into South Lebanon, relieved Rashaya and recaptured Hasbeya and the sacred high places in its vicinity. The insurgents shifted their point of attack to the district north of Damascus in the hope of drawing off the French troops, and by the fifth of December had so far succeeded in their purpose that they were able to reoccupy Hasbeya. The arrival of High Commissioner de Jouvenel in Beirut on December 2 was the signal for a concentrated effort on the part of the insurgents to win a striking success upon which to base forthcoming negotiations. It was planned that Nationalist forces operating in the Hasbeya, Rayak, Baalbeck and Homs regions should converge upon Damascus, where the situation was again tense and where panics had been occurring from time to time as rumors of a fresh bombardment were circulated. On December 6th an engagement was fought near Damascus, and on the 14th and 15th bands of armed insurgents succeeded in entering the city. Not until the 20th was it finally cleared by the French authorities.

FOURTH PHASE—FRANCO-SYRIAN NEGOTIATIONS

Immediately after the repulse of this attack the French authorities made a serious attempt to negotiate an agreement with the insurgents. A delegation, headed by the president of the Damascus Chamber of Com-

merce and a Druse Emir from South Lebanon, conferred with Sultan Pasha al Atrash in Sueida for the purpose of formulating minimum terms to be demanded of France. The Druses and adherents of the People's party were agreed in the view that the French mandate for Syria should be annulled and a Franco-Syrian treaty of limited duration, approved by the League of Nations, substituted for it. Similarly both groups desired membership in the League of Nations and the withdrawal of French troops from Syria. But it was reported that as a matter of fact the Damascus delegation which waited upon de Jouvenel on December 22 confined its demands to the following: recognition of Syrian sovereignty; a national constitution; the immediate establishment of a provisional Syrian government; unification of Syria, including territories annexed to the Lebanon by the first French High Commissioner; a clear definition of the mandatory relationship; general political amnesty.

Franco-Syrian negotiations failed, however, to achieve a satisfactory result before the end of the year. The High Commissioner was willing to grant a constitution and general political amnesty on condition that the rebels lay down their arms before January 8. But he stipulated that the leaders of the rebellion must be tried, and indicated that Sultan Pasha al Atrash, the outstanding leader, would in all probability be banished to France. The Druses, rather than permit the exile of their chief, returned to the struggle once more, while the Damascenes remained unsatisfied on the question of boundary rectification.

THE RESULTING SITUATION

After five months of fighting the situation contained a number of elements favorable to the Nationalists. They had succeeded in securing the recall of an unpopular High Commissioner and the substitution of civilian for military government. They had convinced France that a thorough reorganization of the Syrian administration along more liberal lines was imperative; thus they might look forward to exercising a greater degree of control than formerly in their own government. The ability of Moslems, Christians and Druses to cooperate in the nationalist cause had been demonstrated in the face of predictions to the contrary.* To offset these advantages it was realized that the uprising had failed to ensure the complete independence of Syria and that it had brought about economic depression even more marked than that which had been experienced during the earlier part of the year. The destruction of villages in South Lebanon and the Damascus-Baalbeck-Homs region had rendered over ten thousand persons homeless. Many of the refugees had fled to neighboring cities, intensifying the already abnormal conditions caused by military operations. Others had taken to banditry for a living. Damascus itself resembled an armed camp, being filled with barricades and barbed wire entanglements. Trade and commerce were

* During the bombardment of Damascus, Christian quarters left defenseless by the unexpected withdrawal of French troops were protected by Moslem volunteers. Christians cooperated with Moslems and Druses in the direction of the campaign. In the South Lebanon, where the French, for lack of sufficient troops, armed the inhabitants of Christian villages and left them for a time to repel Druse attacks unaided, there occurred incidents which reawakened religious animosities, but the slaughter of unpractised Christian peasants in this district by professional Druse warriors was recognized by Arab nationalist Christians as being due not to Druse fanaticism so much as to the unpreparedness of the French and to their attempt to force into the conflict an essentially non-combatant population.

stagnant. Roads were unsafe so that transportation of merchandise had practically ceased. Depreciation of the Syrian franc, fluctuating with the French franc, had added uncertainty to all commercial transactions within the mandated territory; and a most serious situation had been created by the failure of the insurgents to harvest their crops, or to plant seed for the next season, as well as by the commandeering by both French and Syrian troops of stores of food found in villages on the line of march.

Repeated petitions to the League of Nations for intervention on behalf of Syria were received by the Permanent Mandates Commission, but consideration of the case was postponed until the meeting of February 1926 when the French Government had agreed to submit a supplementary report covering political activities in the mandated territory for the entire year 1925.

TRANSJORDANIA

SITUATED between Syria on the north and the dominions of Ibn Saud on the south, Transjordan shared intimately during 1925 in the excitement caused on the one hand by the activities of Arab Nationalists in the territory under French mandate and in that caused on the other hand by the Wahabite invasion of the Hadjaz, with which Transjordan possesses railroad connection. In the former case it was openly charged in French circles that the Emir Abdullah, ruler of Transjordan, had actively fomented the Syrian uprising in the hope of recovering for himself the Damascus kingdom from which his brother, Feisal, had been driven by General Gouraud in July 1920.* Be that as it may, soon after the outbreak of hostilities in the Hauran it became necessary for the British authorities to keep strong patrols on the boundary to prevent Druses and other Syrian Nationalists from using Transjordan as a base of operations against the French.

In the case of the conflict in the Hedjaz, the sympathies of the inhabitants of Transjordan were for the most part with King Ali, brother of their own ruler, the Emir Abdullah. As an illustration of this sentiment there may be cited the case of Rikabi Pasha, Premier of Transjordan, who in February 1925 was ousted from office by an assembly of fifty notables and expelled from the country for having treasonably incited the Bedouins of the Arabian peninsula to take up arms against the Sherifian family during the preceding year. Occasional incursions of Wahabites into the southern portion of Transjordan were repulsed from time to time, the outcome of the guerilla warfare along the border being favorable to Transjordan, on whose behalf Great Britain annexed the Red Sea port of Aqaba, formerly belonging to the Hedjaz.

* The reasons for these suspicions were not far to seek. Feisal's kingdom had extended from the province of Aleppo in the north to the boundary of Hedjaz in the south, including the territory known as Transjordan. Until 1920 it had been the British plan that Feisal's kingdom be left intact, but that in accordance with the terms of the secret Anglo-French war-time agreements French influence should predominate in the northern section while the southern section should be a British sphere of influence. But when the French authorities overthrew King Feisal and established direct control in the Damascus-Aleppo region, the British authorities created a separate territory in the south, naming it Transjordan, subjecting it to mandatory control, and appointing to the head of its government the Emir Abdullah. The French authorities believed that Great Britain had placed a member of the Sherifian family in control at Amman for the sole purpose of fostering the movement for restoring the kingdom overthrown by General Gouraud.

Economically, both settled and nomad inhabitants of the territory experienced difficulties on account of the 1925 drought which seriously affected the grape crop and materially reduced herds of cattle. The vigilance of British authorities prevented roaming bands from recouping themselves as in past years at the expense of their Palestinian neighbors—a circumstance which intensified the misfortunes inflicted by nature.

REHABILITATION OF PALESTINE

THE remarkable increase in the volume of Jewish immigration into Palestine, already evident in 1924, became even more accentuated in 1925 when the monthly immigration figures attained an average of 4000 as compared with the year 1923 when the net increase of Jewish population for the entire year had been only 3,788. A feature of the new immigration was the fact that it was comprised largely of middle-class persons possessing a certain amount of capital which they were prepared to invest in industrial or agricultural ventures in Palestine.

Jewish enterprise was responsible for the opening up of twelve new agricultural colonies in the Valley of Jezreel, bringing the total number of rural settlements up to forty-three. Several large manufacturing plants were also established during the year in Tel Aviv, Haifa and elsewhere, and building trades continued active. The establishment of a Technical School in Haifa, the first seaport of Palestine, and the formal inauguration of the Hebrew University and the National Library affiliated with it in Jerusalem, marked a further advance in the educational program of Zionism, already partially fulfilled in the opening of primary and secondary schools in various centres. Bacteriological laboratories, hospitals, clinics and welfare centres supported by funds raised largely among Jews in other countries, increased the scope of their research and health services during the year. An advance was also made in providing standard public utilities and public works in the larger centres of Jewish population.

The attitude of the indigenous Arab population toward Jewish immigration continued on the whole to be unfriendly. An Arab strike on the occasion of the visit of Lord Balfour to Jerusalem in March served to direct public attention to the growing fear of the Arabs that in the course of time they would be relegated to the rôle of an insignificant minority in Palestine. Again on October 14 the grievances of Arabs were formally brought to the attention of the High Commissioner when a protest was presented to him by fifty Arab notables at Jerusalem, whose complaints included the following:

1. Jewish immigration was increasing both the cost of living and the extent of unemployment.
2. Though still a minority, the Jews enjoyed special privileges, securing the key posts in government departments and controlling legislation through the Zionist Attorney-General.
3. The Jewish settlements constituted governments within the government.

Beyond these occurrences there were, however, no political disturbances in Palestine, where there was a greater degree of public safety than in any of the other mandated territories of the Near and Middle East.

CONSOLIDATING THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

TURKISH NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Djevad Bey, first ambassador of the Turkish Republic to France, succinctly described the new mentality of Turkey when he characterized it as involving in part a "jealous defense of the political and economic independence of the Turkish people. . . . by all means possible, and rapid and decisive strides along the road to civilization and progress." The approach of Nationalist leaders to the problems of the year was largely determined by these three purposes—inflexible opposition to any principle that might involve a derogation of Turkey's sovereign rights, stimulation of the economic life of the country, and resolute adherence to the westernization program initiated shortly after the creation of the republic.

The story of the negotiations over the Turco-Iraq boundary illustrates the determination of Turkey not to transfer to any foreign power authority to settle questions affecting Turkey's sovereign rights. It was in this light that Tewfik Rushdi Bey, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained his action during the Geneva negotiations (see pp. 11-13) in a statement to the Grand National Assembly at Angora on January 9, 1926. He said in part, "Since we cannot agree to submit to the decree of an arbitrator any question that touches the sovereign rights of our nation,* it was the duty of our government, as provided by our Organic Law, not to recognize that such an outside arbitrator had any authority in the matter whatsoever."

The advantages gained by the adoption of this attitude were at best inconclusive. More successful was the assertion of Turkey's rights in the case of the dispute with Greece over the expulsion from Constantinople of the Ecumenical Patriarch. The deportation had been effected on January 30 by the Constantinople police on instructions from Angora and without authorization from the League's Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations—the only body which could properly claim jurisdiction in the case. The expulsion brought forth an immediate and vigorous protest from the Greek government, which regarded it as a serious breach of faith on the part of Turkey, since at the Lausanne Conference the Turkish delegate had indicated that the Patriarchate would be permitted to remain in Constantinople on the understanding that it would no longer concern itself with political or administrative questions but confine itself to purely religious matters. The Greek protest was ignored by Turkey. The Athens Government accordingly appealed to the League of Nations for intervention under Article XI of the Covenant whereby the good offices of the League were made available for the settlement of misunderstandings which might affect the good relations of two countries. The Turkish Government, on its part, refused to admit the right of the League to intervene in this matter. The Patriarch had as an individual been liable to expulsion. The manner of his deportation concerned only Turkey and the Mixed Commission,

* It was claimed that the Mosul Vilayet lay strictly within the ethnic frontiers of Turkey. The Turkish Government refused to consider the cession of any part of the territory at the behest of the League Council unless the Turkish delegate were permitted to participate in the final decision of the Council.

and the latter had made no complaint. The retention in Constantinople of the Patriarchate itself was declared to be a matter of purely domestic concern, for although at Lausanne Ismet Pasha had withdrawn his demand for the removal of the Patriarchate from Constantinople, the Turkish Government had signed no agreement that the ecclesiastical see would always be permitted to remain there, and had entered into no international commitments on the subject. Throughout the next three months Turkey continued to urge these contentions, refusing to send a representative to attend the March meeting of the League Council or to recognize the right of the Permanent Court of International Justice to render an advisory opinion as to whether the Turkish objections should preclude the Council from acting in the matter. The controversy finally came to a close when an agreement was arrived at directly between the Greek and Turkish members of the Mixed Commission, to the effect that the abdication of Constantinos VI would be accepted and that a Constantinople prelate not personally liable to deportation would be elected to the Patriarchate in his stead; meanwhile Turkish authorities agreed that they would not continue to press the exchangeability of members of the Holy Synod. When Greece, in accordance with this agreement, requested the League Council to withdraw the question of the Œcumenical Patriarchate from the agenda of its June meeting, Turkey experienced a sense of satisfaction that League intervention and infringement upon what were regarded to be Turkish sovereign rights had been avoided.

FOREIGN TREATIES

In other respects international negotiations during the year served to define more clearly than before the position of the Turkish Republic, in relation more especially to France and to Russia. An amicable agreement was reached in April between France and Turkey for safeguarding the Turco-Syrian frontier which heretofore had been troubled by periodical boundary incidents. A feature of the agreement was the undertaking of France to grant a special degree of autonomy to the Sanjak of Alexandretta, a district inhabited largely by a Turkish-speaking population whose economic interests were bound more closely to those of Turkey than to those of Syria.

A Russo-Turkish agreement, signed on December 17, established between the two countries a greater degree of mutual confidence, recently impaired by Turkish suspicions of a Russian-Italian *rapprochement* and Russian suspicions of Turkey's relationships with the Transcaucasian state of Georgia and the members of the Little Entente. By the December agreement each of the contracting parties undertook to remain neutral if the other were attacked by one or several foreign powers. Each agreed, also, to refrain from any attack against the other, or from participation in any alliance or agreement of a political character with one or more third Powers directed against the other, or from participation in any hostile act directed against the other. Provision was made for the automatic annual prolongation of the Treaty, after the expiry of an initial three-year term, if neither of the contracting parties desired its termination.

No progress was made during the year toward clarifying Turco-American relations. The ratification of the pending Turco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce (signed at Lausanne on August 6, 1923) was urged by the President of the United States and expected so confidently by the Turkish Government that in February an order was issued at Angora for the levying of customs duties on American goods in accordance with the terms of the unratified treaty. But although the Foreign Relations Committee of the American Senate reported the treaty favorably on February 21, it was passed back to that body by the Senate not long afterward for further consideration. At the end of the year diplomatic relations between Turkey and the United States still remained anomalous.

AGRICULTURE A BASIC NATIONAL ACTIVITY

Signs of an approaching economic recovery became evident in Turkey in 1925. The exchange of population between Greece and Turkey, preceded and accompanied by the flight from the country of several thousand Armenians, had seriously depleted the population of the country, affecting agriculture, industry and business alike. Energetic measures were adopted by the Angora Government to counteract the effects of these wholesale migrations. Commerce, transportation and industry were given encouragement by various means. But greatest emphasis was placed by the Government on its measures for the rehabilitation of agriculture, on which the prosperity of the country was felt ultimately to depend. A Ministry of Agriculture had been created, under the auspices of which agricultural schools were opened in various parts of the country, to serve as training centres for prospective farmers. Advice to persons already engaged in farming was provided by agricultural directors and local agents travelling from place to place encouraging farmers to extend the acreage put under crop and improve the quality of their produce by the adoption of scientific farming methods. A model farm was established near Angora. Schools were opened for the training of agricultural engineers and mechanics to meet the growing demands for scientific advice and repair and service stations. An Agricultural Bank was established to extend rural credits for the purchase of seed and machinery. Agricultural machinery, farm implements and gasoline for the operation of trucks were admitted to the country free of duty. The burdensome agricultural tithe which had heretofore absorbed approximately twelve per cent of the farmer's total produce, was changed to a ten per cent tax on produce brought to market, leaving untaxed that portion of the crop which was consumed by the farmer or retained by him for the next seeding.

The Government provided a seed selection service which already in 1925 had helped to improve the quality of crops. A cereal exchange was organized on February 21 for the marketing of cereals and vegetables. The formation of agricultural societies and co-operative unions was encouraged as a means of disseminating information on up-to-date methods of farming.

The practical effect of these measures had already begun in 1925 to be evident in those localities where the activities of the Department of

Agriculture were most pronounced. Partly on account of these measures, partly on account of favorable weather conditions, and partly on account of the reoccupation of the Smyrna district by husbandmen and fruit-growers, the raisin crop of the region for the first time approximately reached pre-war proportions, while fig-production for 1925 exceeded that of pre-war years. The growing of sugar-beets was begun in the Ushak district, a private company having been formed for promoting the enterprise. The Turkish Government subscribed 50 per cent of the authorized capital of this company in the hope of ensuring its success. In the Adana plain shortage of labor necessitated the use of agricultural machinery on an unprecedented scale. The cotton crop of the district far exceeded that of any previous year and the yield of grain was above the average. In Turkey as a whole the total output of tobacco represented a substantial increase over that of previous years.

The general effect of improved agricultural conditions upon the Turkish balance of trade for 1925 has not yet been ascertained; but the latest available statistics—those for the first six months of 1924—indicated that exports had increased 78 per cent, or more than twice as rapidly as imports, which had increased only 35 per cent. It was anticipated that this tendency toward establishing a favorable balance of trade would be accelerated by reason of improved agricultural conditions in 1925, and that trade with European countries would continue to increase rapidly.*

INDUSTRY, TRADE AND FINANCE

Special measures were also adopted for the encouragement of industry, by far the most important of these being the amendments to the law of December 1913 granting certain privileges and immunities to industrial enterprises planning to utilize plant worth a minimum of LT1,000 and to employ workmen whose aggregate annual salaries would reach a minimum of LT750. Privileges and immunities extended to such enterprises included a grant of uninhabited state land tax-free for building purposes and other land grants for purposes of transportation and communication; exemption from payment of customs duties on materials needed to construct or enlarge factories, on raw materials not obtainable within Turkey, and on machinery for the construction of railroads and canals for the transportation of manufactured products. Factories, land and buildings were to be exempted from the land tax, income tax and other taxes, whether national, provincial or municipal.

By founding a Bank of Industry authorized to take over factories the value of whose plants was estimated at LT15,000,000, it was hoped still further to stimulate the economic activity of Turkey. Corporations were to be created to exploit these factories, 51 per cent of the stock in such corporations to be Turkish owned and the remainder to be offered for foreign subscription. Notable among the factories recently founded were the cotton-ginning plant and cotton-mill at Adana, the latter oper-

* During the first six months of 1924 trade statistics showed the following increases as compared with the first six months of 1923: With Italy a 106 percent. increase; United Kingdom, 51 percent.; France, 108 percent.; Germany, 119 percent.; Rumania, 138 per cent.; Russia, 214 percent.; Czechoslovakia, 244 per cent.; Greece, 180 percent. Exports to U. S. A. increased over LT1,000,000, but owing to the decline in imports from that country trade with U. S. A. showed a general decline of 11 percent.

ating 8000 spindles and having a capacity for producing 1500 meters of cloth per day. Arrangements were also made for opening at Constantinople and Karagach factories for the manufacture of agricultural implements, locomotives, railway rolling stock, etc. Iron resources of the country were investigated during the latter part of the year by an Austrian expert engaged by the Ministry of Commerce. These activities represented, however, only a small beginning in the work of building up indigenous industries.

More tangible progress was evident in Turkey, in the improvement of means of transportation, as part of the general project for the advancement of agriculture. A special effort was made to improve roads in the Constantinople district, where road taxes were doubled, in order that the city might be more closely connected with its legitimate hinterland and come to depend less on imported foodstuffs and more on Turkish farm produce made accessible by the government road-building program. In other districts road-building proceeded more slowly. Notable progress was made in several districts in the construction and improvement of Turkish railway lines and service during the year. One hundred and twenty-five miles of new road were constructed on the Angora-Sivas-Samsun line, work proceeded on the Kara Dereh-Eregli line designed to tap large timber reserves, and on the Arghana-Diarbekr-Aradeh line for transporting ore from the copper mines of Arghana; an appropriation was made in March for constructing a railway line to Ak Serai and a project was adopted for linking Konia in the interior with Adalia on the Mediterranean coast.

The financial situation remained difficult, the budget for 1925-6 showing a deficit almost three times as great as that for 1924-5. This situation was caused largely by the heavy appropriations for public works and agricultural, commercial and industrial development which, together with appropriations for educational, religious and philanthropic enterprises, totalled LT57,000,000. The sums devoted to the carrying on of government and the administration of justice amounted to LT31,500,000, while over LT13,800,000 was set aside for the public debt and LT81,000,000 was designated for national defence, the maintenance of order, and the payment of pensions. Taxation remained extremely heavy. Paper currency remained approximately 87½ per cent below par, the paper lira being worth about one-eighth of the gold lira.

EMULATION OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION

The secularization programme of the Turkish Republic which in 1924 had resulted in the abolition of the Caliphate, and of the Sheriat or body of religious law, and in the closing of many of the mosque schools, was prosecuted still further in 1925. Reactionary sentiment which had been gathering headway during 1924 broke out in February 1925 in the form of rebellion in the Eastern Provinces. Ostensibly an uprising for the liberation of Kurdistan it was soon recognized that the revolt was assuming the form of a protest on the part of Orthodox Moslems against the progressive policies originating at Angora. Sheikh Said, the Kurdish chieftain who led the revolt, announced as his objective not only the separation of Kurdistan from Turkey but the restoration of Orthodox

Mohammedan institutions and the re-establishment of the abolished Caliphate, with one of the sons of Abdul Hamid as the new incumbent. Supported by Dervish confraternities and by proscribed leaders of the monarchist group formerly at Constantinople, the revolt extended through several provinces. Within two weeks Harput and Diarbekr were in the hands of the rebels and siege was being laid to Malatia. Before another week had elapsed two-fifths of the standing army of Turkey was engaged in the attempt to put down the revolt. On March 3 the government of Fethi Bey was overgrown by adherents of the Popular Party who desired a more vigorous prosecution of the campaign. Ismet Pasha, the extreme nationalist leader, was made premier. A vigorous censorship was established, members of the Cabinet being empowered to suppress organizations or suspend without trial journals suspected of sympathy with the Kurdish rebels or of stirring up religious fanaticism. Tribunals of Independence established in Angora and in the Eastern Provinces were given power of life and death over the inhabitants. Throughout the month of March the situation continued to grow more and more grave. Several classes of militia were called to the colors. It was the middle of April before Sheikh Said and other leaders of the revolt were captured. To prevent a new outbreak the territory was divided into a number of districts kept under strict military surveillance; large groups of Kurds were deported to Cilicia and the Black Sea coast, the Tribunals of Independence continued to function throughout the year, and all Dervish monasteries in Turkey were closed. The right to wear religious garb was severely restricted so as to prevent its deliberate use as an aid to the spreading of revolutionary propaganda.

The Kurdish revolt did not deter the Angora Government from pushing consistently its program of westernization, upon which, it was believed, prestige in the eyes of Europe would to a large degree depend. Probably the most important item in the program of westernization was the drafting of new civil, commercial and penal codes for the Turkish Republic. Legal experts were engaged on this work for several months and had almost completed their drafts when the year closed. Borrowed directly from the Swiss Civil Code, the German Commercial Code and the Italian Penal Code, the proposed laws were intended to effect a social revolution within the Republic, substituting a thoroughly European tradition for the Mohammedan tradition hitherto prevailing.

Various decrees issued during the year had already introduced western customs alien to the Turkish tradition. The authorities hoped thus to break down barriers of conservatism and prepare the way for a fuller assimilation of Turkish to European manners and customs. Among the innovations were the adoption of the European systems of reckoning the time of day from midnight rather than from sunset and of reckoning years from the birth of Christ rather than from the flight of Mohammed from Mecca in 622 A.D. A decree was also issued instructing all citizens to adopt surnames. State employees were directed to wear European clothing. The general body of citizens also was encouraged to conform to European fashions of dress. A commotion was caused throughout the country by a decree forbidding the wearing of fezzes. Together with other innovations this deeply stirred ultra-conservative groups and

led to arrests and trials before the Tribunals of Independence, but in the main the new regulations were observed and in many districts enthusiastically welcomed as aids to the emancipation of Turkey.

DEVELOPMENT OF ARMENIA

IN that part of Armenia which as a result of the war was separated from the Ottoman Empire and ultimately became established as an independent country within the Russian Soviet system, steady progress has been recorded in the work of national rehabilitation.

Projects of the Armenian Government for the development of national resources were gradually being put into effect throughout 1925. In June a new irrigation canal was formally opened. Progress was made on plans for the electrification of the capital, Erivan,—a large power plant being under construction which, when completed, was expected to furnish light and power at low cost to rural as well as urban districts. Experiments in cotton-growing showed satisfactory results, especially in the case of long-fibre varieties, in the production of which it is anticipated that Armenia would specialize when the industry became established.* Reforestation of mountain slopes and the restocking of lakes with fish also formed part of the program carried out during the year by the Armenian Minister of Agriculture.

Promotion of the welfare of women and children, entrusted to a special department of government under the administrative control of Mme. Vardanian, the only woman in the Armenian Cabinet, has occupied a relatively important place in the year's activities. Child welfare centers and clinics for mothers have been opened in various districts in furtherance of the Government plan for providing a school, a hospital and a child welfare center in every locality. The Armenian Government also took over during the year the administration of one of the orphanages hitherto controlled by a British philanthropic organization, funds for the upkeep of the institution being still provided, however, by foreign philanthropy.

A plan sponsored by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen for the repatriation of fifteen thousand Armenians now in Greece and Constantinople was tentatively approved on September 26 by the League of Nations on the recommendation of the League Humanitarian Commission. The plan included the raising of a loan of nine million gold roubles for the purpose of opening up to irrigation 105,000 acres of new land in the Erivan district upon which the incoming settlers could be accommodated. A small commission was appointed to ascertain finally the technical feasibility of the scheme, and to discuss with authoritative bodies the details whereby it could be put into effect.

* A new cotton factory has recently been opened in Erivan.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN PERSIA

POLITICAL READJUSTMENT

BY THE bloodless revolution of October 31, 1925, the Persian Mejliss (National Council) put an end to the rule of the Kajar dynasty established one hundred and twenty-six years ago. The event was the climax in a series of recent political crises engendered by the unremitting ambition of Reza Khan Pahlevi, who had been exercising an increasing degree of control in public affairs since the *coup d'etat* of February 1921, when he had used his power as an officer in the Persian army to overthrow the existing Government and established himself as Minister of War under a Premier of his own choosing. Within two and a half years his position had been sufficiently consolidated to make it possible for Reza Khan to seize the premiership himself (October 31, 1923). There had ensued a trial of strength between the new Premier and the reigning Shah, Ahmad Kajar, which resulted in the virtual exile of the latter to Southern Europe. During 1924 abortive attempts were made on the one hand by the conservative clergy and lay supporters of the former régime to bring about the return of the Shah, and on the other hand by Reza Khan and his friends to secure the Shah's formal deposition. In spite of his initial failure, the Premier continued to work toward this end, and on February 13, 1925, secured for himself from the Mejliss an extension of powers such that his position amounted to a military dictatorship. But it was not until after the summer recess of the Mejliss that he felt sufficiently well prepared to strike the final blow through the agency of the Mejliss. Basing its action upon telegrams received from the provinces, in which the overthrow of the Shah was demanded, the Mejliss on October 31 issued the following declaration:

"In the name of the welfare of the people, the National Consultative Assembly declares the abolition of the Kajar Sovereignty and within the limits of the Constitution and other laws entrusts the Provisional Government to the person of Reza Khan Pahlevi. The determining of the form of the permanent government shall be made by a constituent assembly."

Eighty members supported the declaration, and five opposed it openly, thirty being absent from the Council Chamber when the vote was taken. The small dissident group demanded a public referendum and attacked the declaration as a violation of the Constitution and the oath of allegiance. But the terms of the declaration became immediately effective. The Crown Prince and members of the royal household, on pension from Reza Khan, left the country forthwith. The Constituent Assembly met (November 6-December 14) and performed its work with despatch. The overthrow of the Kajar dynasty was confirmed and Reza Khan was elevated to the throne of Persia as a constitutional monarch, the first of a new hereditary dynasty. The deposed Shah, meanwhile, had refused to recognize the action of the Mejliss, issuing the following declaration from Paris on November 7th:

"I consider as void and without value all present and future acts of his (Reza Khan's) Government. I maintain all my rights and those of my dynasty to the throne of Persia, which, by the grace of

God, I hold according to the fundamental laws of my country's Constitution. I am and remain the legitimate constitutional sovereign of Persia."

But the provisional recognition of the revolutionary government by Great Britain, Russia and all other foreign countries represented at the Persian capital, had before November 8 already indicated the willingness of outside Governments to acquiesce in the deposition of the former Shah.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN PERSIA

The chief economic difficulty of the country still remains the problem of transportation. The only railroads are those which approach or enter Persia from Armenia, Iraq and Baluchistan, ending abruptly at the boundary or not far from it. Rumors were current during September of negotiations between the Persian Government and a large American banking and industrial group relative to a concession for constructing a railroad from Teheran to the Persian Gulf, but no definite agreement of this nature was announced before the close of the year. Autobus passenger service continued to function at irregular intervals between Teheran and the Khanikin railway terminus in Iraq (450 miles) and between Teheran and Resht on the Caspian Sea (230 miles). During the year a German firm was awarded a five-year contract for conducting an aeroplane mail service between Enzeli, Teheran, Qasr-i-Shirin and Bushire.

The ordinary economic difficulties of Persia were enhanced during 1925 by a spring drought which seriously affected the nut crop in the north and reduced the supply of breadstuffs so materially that bread riots broke out in Teheran in September. One of the first acts of Reza Khan in his capacity as head of the Provisional Government was to provide a State subsidy to reduce the price of bread.

Earlier in the year a government monopoly of tea and sugar was instituted by the Mejliss. This was expected to increase the annual national revenues by \$5,500,000. The September decision of the League of Nations to despatch a Commission to Persia to inquire into the feasibility of substituting other crops for opium gave prospect of materially affecting the national revenue, a substantial fraction of which had recently been derived from opium taxes. Confidence in the administrative policies of Dr. A. C. Millspaugh, Director-General of Finance, was indicated in the decision of the Mejliss to add twelve new American assistants to his staff. This made possible a more effective organization of the financial administration in outlying provinces.

Other significant developments of the year were the competition between various firms for securing the right to exploit Persian oil reserves, and the continued attempts of Russian and British representatives at Teheran to influence the course of public events to the advantage of their respective Governments. These combined influences made it difficult for the new Shah to maintain the degree of independence he was known to desire. The actual extent and nature of foreign influence imposed upon him was, however, obscure.

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